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Abstract
This paper expands Teichroew, Robichek and Montalbano’s (TRM) (1965a,b) rate-of-
return model into a complete and general model of economic profitability for investment
decision-making. Specifically, TRM’s assumptions are relaxed and a project rate of return
is derived, expressing the project’s overall economic profitability; direct relations among
rates, costs of capital and net present value are supplied. The various value drivers are
identified and isolated, and the NPV is decomposed into financing NPV and investment
NPV . The approach allows for any pattern of financing rates, investment rates, and
costs of capital. Relations with old literature and new literature on rates of return are
shown: the link between them is obtained by making use of the mean operator (i.e., affine
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1 Introduction
Although the internal rate of return (IRR) model is not so robust a model, theoretically and
practically,1 it is nonetheless massively used by managers and professionals for investment
decision-making. Soon after its inception (Fisher, 1930; Boulding 1935), scholars have long
debated about difficulties of the IRR, some of them explicitly claiming that the problems
are the sign of a general inadequacy of the IRR to capture the idea of a rate of return. For
example, Hirshleifer (1958) wrote: “The fact that the use of [the IRR] leads to the correct
decision in a particular case or a particular class of cases does not mean that it is correct in
principle” (p. 348) and “These instances of failure of the multi-period internal-rate-of-return
rule . . . are, of course, merely the symptom of an underlying erroneous conception” (p. 349).
Bailey (1959) recognized that there exist infinitely many sequences of varying period rates,
the IRR sequence (with constant rate) being only one of them, bearing no more importance
than any other sequence: “This is an example of the “paradox” that have attracted so much
attention in connection with investment decision criteria. It should be evident, however, that
this paradox is merely an accident of the simplifying device of dealing with a single long-term
rate of interest, and that it has no special importance” (pp. 478-479); he acknowledged that
“recognition of the correct general solution of the investment problem has been hindered by
the habit of thinking in terms of a single, long-term rate of interest” (p. 477). Herbst (1978)
underscored that the mixed nature of IRR arising in mixed projects (rate of return/rate of
cost) shows that IRR, in general, “is not a proper measure of return on investment. This is
a crucial criticism of the IRR − even though it may be unique, and real in the mathematical
sense, this in itself is not a sufficient condition for it to be a correct measure of return on
investment” (p. 367, italics in original) and “a unique, real IRR is no assurance that the
rate obtained is a proper measure of return on investment (or cost of financing)” (p. 369).
Some scholars went as far as to propose alternative methods (e.g., Solomon 1956; Karmel
1959; Weingartner, 1966; Arrow and Levhari, 1969; Ramsey, 1970). Particularly relevant is
Teichroew, Robichek and Montalbano’s (1965a,b) proposal; though not widespread in finance,
it is still well appreciated, both in academic papers (e.g., Chiu and Garza Escalante, 2012)
and in textbooks (Herbst, 2002; Park, 2011; Blank and Tarquin, 2012). Teichroew, Robichek
and Montalbanno (TRM, hereafter) presented an NPV -consistent model based on two rates,
1See Magni (2013) for a compendium of eighteen flaws of the IRR.
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a financing rate and an investment rate, either of which is exogenously set equal to the cost
of capital and the other is endogenously derived. By comparing the latter with the former,
value creation (i.e., wealth increase) is signalled.
In the last decade, some important contributions have shed light on the issue and given
fresh insights. Hazen (2003, 2009) set a direct relation between internal rate of return (IRR)
and the net present value (NPV ), the link being provided by IRR-implied investment bal-
ances. In particular, the IRR is a rate of return associated with an implied overall capital:
if the capital is positive (negative), the project is interpreted as an investment (borrowing)
and the IRR is a rate of return (cost); in such a way, any one IRR, associated with its own
implied capital, can be interchangeably used for decision-making. Hartman and Schafrick
(2004) made use of differential calculus and intervals of monotonicity of the NPV function
to identify the “relevant” rate of return from a set of IRRs and to identify the nature of a
project as an investment or a borrowing.2 In the last paragraph of their paper, the authors
called for future research bringing forth a link between the past tradition and the recent find-
ings: “As for future research, it would be interesting to more formally tie this method to the
methods of Hazen (2003) and Teichroew, Robichek, and Montalbano (1965). Perhaps the link
may lie in investment balances” (p. 157). In this respect, Magni (2010) partially accomplished
the task: consistently with Bailey (1959), who underscored the role of sequences of period
rates (as opposed to a single, long-term return rate), Magni (2010) showed that the financial
nature of a project depends on the choice of one among infinite sequences of project balances
(capitals) and, therefore, on the choice of one among infinite sequences of period rates. The
capital-weighted mean of a selected sequence of period rates, called Average Internal Rate of
Return (AIRR), correctly signals value creation. This idea is made more explicit in Magni
(2013), where a project is redefined as a vector of estimated cash flows and capitals,3 which
is associated with a unique rate of return.
However, the link to the TRM model, invoked by Hartman and Schafrick (2004), is a task
2Some interesting contributions have been devoted to complex-valued rates of return: Osborne (2010)
showed that the product of the absolute values of all the IRRs (complex-valued as well as real-valued IRRs)
can be used for accept/reject decisions. Pierru (2010) showed that complex-valued rates can be given economic
significance. Hazen (2003) succeeded in extending his acceptability rule to complex-valued rates and capitals.
3The determination of capitals is a matter of estimation, analogous to the estimation of cash flows. As
Magni (2013) underlies, estimation of cash flows often derives from estimation of capitals and incomes (see
Titman and Martin, 2011. See also F11 and F15 in Magni, 2013).
2
which still waits to be carried out. This paper just supplies this missing link. We develop
the TRM model, complete it and generalize it by making use of the same tool Magni (2010,
2013) used for developing the AIRR paradigm: the mean operator.4 We then realize an
average-based TRM model, which (i) removes the stringent assumption according to which
either the project financing rate or the project investment rate is equal to the cost of capital,
(ii) condenses the above-mentioned pair of rates into a rate of return capturing the whole
project’s economic profitability, (iii) provides direct relations among rates, NPV and cost
of capital, (iv) highlights the role of both capitals and rates as value drivers, (v) divides
the project’s NPV into two shares, one generated in the investment periods (investment
NPV ), the other one generated in the financing periods (financing NPV ), (vi) generalizes
the approach allowing for any pattern of financing rates, investment rates, costs of capital,
(vii) unearthes the existence of two project costs of capital: the financing cost of capital,
applied in the financing periods, and the investment cost of capital, applied in the investment
periods.
Not surprisingly, our average-based approach turns out to be equivalent to Magni’s (2010,
2013) approach. The difference lies in the fact that we start from (financing and investment)
rates to obtain project balances (i.e., capitals), whereas Magni (2010, 2013) starts from
capitals to derive period rates. But there is a one-to-one correspondence between the vector
of capitals and the vector of period rates, so the two approaches are but two sides of the same
coin.
Old and new ideas, seemingly disparate, are naturally encompassed in this average-based
TRM model. In particular, Bailey’s (1959) suggestion of fixing all period rates equal to the
equilibrium rates except one is naturally encompassed in our average-based model, and leads
to a significant market-determined project rate of return, which is consistent with security
pricing in an efficient market; Chiu and Garza Escalante’s (2012) “Generalized Relative Rate
of Return” is embodied in our average-based model as a particular case.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminary
notions and TRM’s two fundamental theorems, one of which states the existence and unique-
4Strictly speaking, we will use affine combination (of rates), i.e. linear combinations with (positive or
negative) weights summing to 1. However, if a weight is negative, one can always charge a rate with the
opposite sign in order to keep positive signs for all the weights. In such a way, the affine combination can
always be viewed as a convex combination, that is, a weighted mean.
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ness of an invertible investment-rate function, the other one presents two NPV -consistent
acceptability rules based on comparison of the project investment rate (or project financing
rate) with the cost of capital. In section 3 we complete the TRM model; in particular, we
remove the stringent assumption according to which either rate must be equal to the cost of
capital and present an acceptability rule which include TRM’s acceptability rules as particu-
lar cases. The financing and investment rates are condensed into a project rate of return, the
NPV is decomposed into financing NPV and investment NPV , and the results are reframed
in terms of markups and excess rates. Section 4 allows for varying costs of capital; we assume
that financing rates and investment rates are variable but move in line with the market rates.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of an invertible investment-markup function which
generalizes the invertible investment-rate function introduced by TRM (1965a,b). Chiu and
Garza Escalante’s (2012) “Generalized Relative Rate of Return” is found to be a particular
value taken on by the investment-markup function. Section 5 allows for any possible patterns
of borrowing rates and investment rates, irrespective of the term structure of interest rates.
Bailey’s (1959) hint at value creation in one single period is studied in detail: it is shown
that the result is the same as that which would be obtained in an efficient market, that is,
in a market in which security prices quickly adjust to new information. Section 6 shows
that the approach is logically equivalent to the AIRR approach and that the average-based
TRM model can be interpreted as an ‘AIRR-based’ model. Some concluding remarks end
the paper.
2 Preliminary results
Consider a market in equilibrium (i.e., no arbitrage opportunities exist) and let ~r = (r1, . . . , rn)
describe the term structure of interest rates. The rate rt is the forward rate (or equilibrium
rate) holding between t− 1 and t. Consider any asset a (e.g., a firm, a project, a security)
whose cash flow stream is ~a = (a1, . . . , aq), q ∈ N. The value V at of such an asset at time
t = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1 is defined as the price at which the asset (or a twin security) is traded in
the market:
V at = V
a
t (~r) =
q∑
j=t+1
aj
(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2) · . . . · (1 + rj) V
a
q = 0. (1)
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Consider now a project, denoted as p, consisting of the cash-flow vector ~f = (f0, f1, . . . , fn), n ∈
N. The project’s net present value is the difference between the project’s value at time 0 and
the project cost c0 = −f0:
NPV = NPV (~r) = V p0 − c0 = f0 +
n∑
t=1
ft
(1 + r1)(1 + r2) · . . . · (1 + rt) .
We assume that cash flows are expressed as certainty equivalents, but the formal analysis is
unvaried if cash flows are thought of as expected values of stochastic variables; in such a case,
rt is a risk-adjusted rate of return which incorporates a premium for risk, and V
a
t represents
the market price, at time t, of a portfolio which replicates the asset’s cash flows in every state
of nature (see Mason and Merton, 1985; Smith and Nau, 1995).
A project p is worth undertaking (economically profitable) if and only if NPV (~r) > 0. In
this case, value is created (i.e., wealth is increased) for the firm’s shareholders. The equilib-
rium rate rt represents the cost of capital (COC, hereafter) in the t-th period. Throughout
the paper, we will use the terms “equilibrium rate”, “market rate”, “cost of capital” as
synonyms.
Vector ~ı = (ı1, . . . , ın) ∈ Rn is a vector of internal rates of return if NPV (~ı) = 0:
f0 +
n∑
t=1
ft
(1 + ı1)(1 + ı2) . . . (1 + ıt)
= 0. (2)
The vector ~ = (, , . . . , ) is a particular case of internal-rate-of-return vector with a constant
period rate. The common value  is called “internal rate of return” (IRR). In this case, (2)
reduces to
f0 +
n∑
t=1
ft
(1 + )t
= 0. (3)
The capital invested in the project at the beginning of the t-th period is recursively defined
as
ct = ct−1(1 + ıt)− ft c0 = −f0, cn = 0. (4)
A positive capital is interpreted as an investment (i.e., lending money), a negative capital is
interpreted as a financing (i.e. borrowing money).5 Note that ıt is the internal rate of return
of the one-period project whose cash-flow vector is (−ct−1, ct + ft):
−ct−1 + ct + ft
1 + ıt
= 0.
5Project balance is project’s capital changed in sign.
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From (1), the value of any asset a fulfills the equilibrium relation
V at = V
a
t−1(1 + rt)− at Vq = 0 (5)
which is analogous to (4). Letting T = {1, . . . , n}, we give the following
Definition 2.1. A project is pure if and only if either ct−1 ≥ 0 for every t ∈ T or ct−1 ≤ 0 for
every t ∈ T . A project is mixed if and only if there exists j, k ∈ T such that cj−1 · ck−1 < 0.
Teichroew, Robichek and Montalbano (1965a,b) (hereafter, TRM) made use of a financing
rate and an investment rate to derive the sequence ~c = (c0, c1, . . . , cn−1) of interim capitals.
Letting x and y denote the two rates, the capital is recursively defined as
ct(x, y) =
 ct−1(x, y)(1 + x)− ft if ct−1(x, y) ≤ 0ct−1(x, y)(1 + y)− ft if ct−1(x, y) > 0 (6)
with c0(x, y) := −f0. This definition is a particular case of (4) where
ıt =
 x if ct−1(x, y) ≤ 0y if ct−1(x, y) > 0 (7)
We summarize the first result of TRM in the following
Theorem 2.1 (TRM1). The equation cn(x, y) = 0 implicitly defines an investment-rate
function y = y(x) which is continuous and strictly increasing. Given that y(x) is strictly
increasing, the same equation implicitly defines a financing-rate function x = x(y), which is
continuous and strictly increasing as well, and represents the inverse function of y(x).
(See, in particular, TRM, 1965a, Theorems III-IV and Figures I(a)-I(b)). Note that any pair
(x, y) satisfying the terminal condition cn(x, y) = 0 unequivocally determines the sequence
~c =
(
c0(x, y), c1(x, y), . . . , cn−1(x, y)
)
. The authors assume a constant equilibrium rate (i.e.,
rt = r for every t) and use TRM1 to show two NPV -consistent decision criteria.
Theorem 2.2 (TRM2). The following acceptability rules hold:
Rule 1. Assume x = r. Then, a project is acceptable (i.e., NPV > 0) if and only if
y(r) > r.
Rule 2. Assume y = r. Then, a project is acceptable (i.e., NPV > 0) if and only if
x(r) < r.
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(See also TRM, 1965b, p. 176). We will henceforth refer to these theorems as TRM1 and
TRM2.
Consistently with TRM’s framework, we explicitly partition the project in an investment
(lending) region TI = {t ∈ T : ct−1 > 0} and a financing (borrowing) region TB = {t ∈
T : ct−1 ≤ 0}, where TB ∪ TI = T . In the investment region, a capital is interpreted as an
investment (the firm is loaning to the project), whereas in the borrowing region, a capital
is interpreted as a financing (the project is loaning to the firm). From this point of view,
ct−1(x, y), t ∈ TI , is the amount “invested” in the t-th period, while |ct−1(x, y)|, t ∈ TB is the
amount “borrowed” in the t-th period.
Note that (7) can also be framed as
ıt =
x if t ∈ TBy if t ∈ TI
or, in vectorial form,
~ı = (ıt = x for t ∈ TB, ıt = y for t ∈ TI).
Definition 2.2. A pair (x, y) is said to be admissible if cn(x, y) = 0
It is worth highlighting the often neglected fact that TRM present (not one but) two
acceptability rules (see TRM 2), derived from two different admissible pairs: the authors
suggest to assume either x = r or y = r, so that two pairs of financing rate and investment
rate can be interchangeably used by the evaluator; the two pairs are
(
r, y(r)
)
and
(
x(r), r
)
,
which mean
ıt =
r if t ∈ TBy(r) if t ∈ TI or ıt =
x(r) if t ∈ TBr if t ∈ TI .
In vectorial terms,
~ı = (ıt = r for t ∈ TB, ıt = y(r) for t ∈ TI) or ~ı = (ıt = x(r) for t ∈ TB, ıt = y for t ∈ TI)
which entail two different vectors of interim capitals (i.e., project balances):
~c =
(
c0, c1
(
r, y(r)
)
, . . . , cn−1
(
r, y(r)
))
or ~c =
(
c0, c1
(
x(r), r
)
, . . . , cn−1
(
x(r), r
))
.
It is up to the evaluator to choose either assumption.
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3 Relaxing the assumptions and completing the TRM model
In this section we assume, consistently with TRM, rt = r for every t ∈ T . We first aggregate
invested capitals on one side and borrowed capitals on the other side:
I :=
∑
t∈TI
ct−1vt
is the total invested amount and
B :=
∑
t∈TB
|ct−1|vt
is the total borrowed amount. The net capital invested is
I −B =
∑
t∈T
ct−1vt
where vt := (1 + r)−t denotes the current value of one monetary unit available at time t.
Evidently, if I > B, the firm loans the project more than it borrows from it. If, instead
I < B, the firm borrows from the project more than it loans to it. This triggers the following
Definition 3.1. If I > B, the project is a net investment; if I < B, the project is a net
financing (borrowing).
Theorem 3.1. Let (x, y) be an admissible pair. Then, the NPV can be partitioned into an
“investment NPV ” and a “financing NPV ”:
NPV (r) =
(
y − r)I︸ ︷︷ ︸
investment NPV
+ (r − x)B︸ ︷︷ ︸
financing NPV
(8)
where I = I(x, y) and B = B(x, y).
Proof.
NPV (r) =
n∑
t=0
ftv
t =
n∑
t=0
(ft − ct + ct)vt
=
n∑
t=1
(
vt(ft + ct)− vt−1 · ct−1
)
=
∑
t∈TB
(
vt · ct−1(1 + x)− vt−1 · ct−1
)
+
∑
t∈TI
(
vt · ct−1(1 + y)− vt−1 · ct−1
)
.
(9)
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Using the fact that vt ·ct−1(1+y)−vt−1 ·ct−1 = y ·ct−1vt−r ·ct−1vt for t ∈ TI and, analogously,
vt · ct−1(1 + x)− vt−1 · ct−1 = x · ct−1vt − r · ct−1vt for t ∈ TB,
NPV (r) =
∑
t∈TB
xct−1vt +
∑
t∈TI
yct−1vt −
(∑
t∈TB
rct−1vt +
∑
t∈TI
rct−1vt
)
(10)
whence
NPV (r) = yI − xB − r(I −B) (11)
Equation (8) is just a reframing of (11).
Theorem 3.1 enables the evaluator to isolate the drivers of value creation: NPVI(r) =
I(y − r) is the investment NPV , while NPVB(r) = B(r − x) is the financing NPV :
NPV (r) = NPVI(r) +NPVB(r). (12)
In other words, the project’s overall economic profitability is the result of two joint effects:
one captures the value created by the investment side, the second one captures the value
created by the borrowing side. As for the former, investors earn y− r per each unit of capital
invested I in the lending periods. A positive (negative) sign of the excess rate indicates that
the return rate is greater (smaller) than the COC. Analogously, in the borrowing periods,
investors earn r−x per each unit of borrowed capital B. A positive (negative) sign means that
the investor is borrowing from the project at a rate that is smaller (greater) than the market
rate. Thus, the equilibrium rate r acts as a benchmark for investment in the investment
periods, whereas it acts as a benchmark for financing in the financing periods: in the former
case, r is a foregone rate of return (investors might invest the same amount I at the rate
r); in the latter case, r is a foregone rate of cost (investors might borrow the same amount
B at the rate r). Therefore, comparison of y and r informs about economic profitability on
the investment side, while comparison of x and r informs about economic profitability on the
borrowing side.
Inspecting eq. (8), the following acceptability criterion is straightforward.
Corollary 3.1. For any admissible pair (x, y), the following conditions hold:
— if y > r > x, then the project should be undertaken;
— if y < r < x, then the project should be rejected.
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Whenever the assumptions made in the above corollary are not fulfilled, the two NPV s
(NPVI) and NPVB) have different signs and the net effect will depend not only on the
respective excess rates y− r and r−x but also on the capital bases on which the excess rates
are applied − i.e., on I and B.
The twofold information provided by the financing and investment sides can be condensed
into a single relative measure of worth, capturing the whole project’s economic profitability.
Theorem 3.2. For any admissible pair, there exists a unique rate of return ı, which is an
affine combination of x and y, whose weights are represented by the proportion of investment
and financing on the overall capital involved:
ı =
yI − xB
I −B (13)
where I = I(x, y) and B = B(x, y). Also,
If the project is a net investment, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ı > r (14a)
If the project is a net financing, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ı < r. (14b)
Proof. The amount yI − xB represents the project’s net return (difference between return
accrued on invested capital and interest accrued on borrowed capital); dividing it by the net
capital invested I −B, one obtains the net return per unit of net capital invested, which just
expresses the overall project’s rate of return (or rate of cost, if I < B). Using (13), eq. (11)
becomes
NPV (r) = (I −B)(ı− r) (15)
whence (14).
Practically, the steps for computing the project’s rate of return and establish whether the
project is worth undertaking are the following ones:
1. pick the financing rate and the investment rate and compute the invested capital I and
the borrowed amount B
2. compute the capital-weighted mean of the two rates (this is the project rate of return)
3. compare the project rate of return with the cost of capital to determine acceptability.
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Note that step 2. can be replaced by
ı = r +
NPV (r)
I −B (16)
which, derived from (15), is equivalent to (13).
Remark 3.1. TRM2 can be directly derived from Theorem 3.1 by picking x = r (Rule 1) or
y = r (Rule 2). Consider x = r, which implies that the project investment rate is y(r). The
invested amount is then I = I
(
r, y(r)
)
, and (8) reduces to
NPV (r) = I
(
r, y(r)
) · (y(r)− r)+B(r(y(r)) · 0
= I(r, y(r)) · (y(r)− r). (17)
In such a way, the excess investment rate y(r) − r has the same sign as the NPV (since
I(r, y(r)) > 0 by definition). Assuming, by contrast, y = r, the project financing rate
x = x(r) is derived. In this case, (8) may be written as
NPV (r) = I
(
x(r), r
) · 0 +B(x(r), y) · (r − x(r)))
= B(x(r), r) · (r − x(r)). (18)
so the excess financing rate r − x(r) has the same sign as NPV (r) (since B(x(r), r) > 0 by
definition).
It is now clear that, to impose the requirement that x be equal to r, means to exogenously
impose that the financing side of the project become a zero-NPV course of action and that
the rate of return on the investment side be y(r). Alternatively, to impose the requirement
that y be equal to r means to impose that the investment side of the project be a zero-NPV
course of action and that the financing rate be x(r). Formally, either choice can be made
(resulting in (17) or (18)), depending on whether one aims to stress the financing side or
the investment side of the project and consistently use the cost of capital as a benchmark
investment rate or as a benchmark financing rate.
Therefore, the hub of TRM’s model is that of nullifying (i.e., neutralizing) one of the two
sides so as to shift the whole creation of value to the other side. The authors’ ad hoc strategy
is an ingenious device to obtain a pure IRR having the meaning of rate of cost (borrowing
side) and a pure IRR having the meaning of a rate of return (investment side). One of the
two IRRs is just the equilibrium rate r, the other one is endogenously derived from it. Armed
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with these two pure IRRs, one of which is irrelevant for value creation, NPV consistency is
ensured by comparing the other IRR with the equilibrium rate.
More generally, value creation or destruction depends on both the financing side and
the investment side: part of the wealth increase occurs in the investment periods, and part
of it is created in the financing periods. However, in TRM’s world the evaluator has only
two (mandatory) choices: x = r or y = r: if one removes these assumptions, the TRM
model as such breaks down, for consistency with NPV is not guaranteed any more. In
contrast, we have just shown that, by employing the mean operator, the financing rate and
the investment rate can be freed from TRM’s restrictive assumptions: x and y need not be
equal to r. That is, both x 6= r and y 6= r are allowed, which means that both the investment
and the financing region contribute to determine the investors’ wealth increase or decrease.
As a result, Theorems 3.1-3.2 (i) disengage x and y from r, (ii) quantify the contributions
of financing and investment side, (iii) give account of the specific role of x, y and r, (iii)
provide the evaluator with the project rate of return. As for the latter point, it should be
clear that neither x nor y is the project rate of return; y represents the rate of return of the
investment side and x is the rate of cost of the financing side, respectively. So, each of them
only tells part of the story. Both x and y give a contribution, and Theorem 3.2 just supplies
the important piece of information which is not present in the original TRM’s model.
Remark 3.2. TRM’s Rule 1 and Rule 2 bring about different quantifications of the investment
and financing side:
B
(
r, y(r)
) 6= B(x(r), r)
I
(
r, y(r)
) 6= I(x(r), r)
as well as different investment rates and different financing rates: (r, y(r)) 6= (x(r), r). This
in turn entails the existence of two project rates of return, one for each choice: if x is fixed
first (x = r), then the project rate of return is
ı(r, y) =
yI(r, y)− rB(r, y)
I(r, y)−B(r, y)
where y = y(r); if y is fixed first (y = r), then the project rate of return is
ı(x, r) =
rI(x, r)− xB(x, r)
I(x, r)−B(x, r)
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where x = x(r). Consequently, from (15)
NPV (r) =
(
I(r, y)−B(r, y)) · (ı(r, y)− r) (19a)
NPV (r) =
(
I(x, r)−B(x, r)) · (ı(x, r)− r). (19b)
We can then state the following
Corollary 3.2. In the TRM model, the project rate of return is either ı(r, y) or ı(x, r)
depending on whether the evaluator assumes x = r or y = r. Also,
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ı(r, y) > r (20a)
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ı(x, r) > r (20b)
where y = y(r) and x = x(r) (if the project is a net borrowing, the sign of the second equalities
of (20) is reversed).
Remark 3.3. We have claimed that x and y represent the IRR of the investment side and the
IRR of the financing side, respectively. This derives from the fact thatNPVI(r) = (y−r)I = 0
if and only if y = r and NPVB(r) = (r − x)B = 0 if and only if x = r.6 This makes ı an
average of two internal rates of return. Therefore, it is an “average internal rate of return”
(AIRR) and lies on the iso-value line (the graph of the AIRR function. See Magni, 2010,
2013).
Any pair (x, y) unequivocally defines a pair (%, ϕ) of financing markup rate and investment
6Alternatively, in terms of cash flows, note that cn(x, y) = 0, may be rewritten as
f0 +
f1
(1 + x)α1(1 + y)β1
+
f2
(1 + x)α2(1 + y)β2
+ . . .+
fn
(1 + x)αn(1 + y)βn
= 0
where αj represents the number of financing periods and βj represents the number of investment periods
between time 0 and time j, so that αj + βj = j, j = 1, ..., n. Therefore,
f0 +
fx1
(1 + y)β1
+
fx2
(1 + y)β2
+ . . .+
fxn
(1 + y)βn
= 0
where fxt := ft(1 + x)
−αt or, equivalently,
f0 +
fy1
(1 + x)α1
+
fy2
(1 + x)α2
. . .+
fyn
(1 + x)αn
= 0
where fyt := ft(1 + y)
−βt .
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markup rate (markdown if negative)
ϕ :=
y − r
1 + r
(21a)
% :=
x− r
1 + r
. (21b)
such that
1 + y = (1 + r)(1 + ϕ)⇐⇒ y = r + ϕ(1 + r)
1 + x = (1 + r)(1 + %)⇐⇒ x = r + %(1 + r).
We can then reframe the project rate of return in terms of markup:
ı = r + ϑ(1 + r) ⇐⇒ 1 + ı = (1 + r)(1 + ϑ) (22)
where ϑ is a suitable weighted mean of the markups:
ϑ = ϑ(%, ϕ) =
ϕ · I − % ·B
I −B . (23)
Therefore,
NPV (r) =
(
ϕI − %B)(1 + r) (24)
and (14) can be reframed as
If the project is a net investment, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ϑ(%, ϕ) > 0 (25a)
If the project is a net financing, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ϑ(%, ϕ) < 0. (25b)
TRM’s investment-rate function y(x) unequivocally defines an investment-markup function
ϕ(%), while the financing-rate function x(y) unequivocally defines a financing-markup function
%(ϕ) which is the inverse function of ϕ(%). The two particular cases studied by TRM (i.e.,
x = r and y = r) become % = 0 and ϕ = 0; in the former case, ϕ = ϕ(0) and NPV (r) =
ϕ(0) · I(0, ϕ(0)), so that Rule 1 becomes
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ϕ(0) > 0;
in the latter case, % = %(0) and NPV (r) = −%(0) ·B(%(0), 0) so that Rule 2 becomes
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if %(0) < 0.
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Remark 3.4. Let I ′ :=
∑
t∈TI ct−1v
t−1 and B′ :=
∑
t∈TB ct−1v
t−1. Then, the project markup
can be reframed as
ϑ =
ϕI ′ − %B′
I ′ −B′ ,
since I ′ = I(1 + r) and B′ = B(1 + r), and (24) can be written as
NPV (r) = ϕI ′ − %B′ (26)
(We will make extensive use of I ′ and B′ in section 4.)
Any pair (x, y) also unequivocally defines a pair (ρ, φ) of financing excess rate and invest-
ment excess rate:
ρ : = x− r (27a)
φ : = y − r. (27b)
The project rate of return can be reframed as
ı = r + θ (28)
where
θ := θ(ρ, φ) =
φI − ρB
I −B =
φI ′ − ρB′
I ′ −B′
is the weighted mean of the two excess rates, so (14) may be reframed as
If the project is a net investment, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if θ > 0 (29a)
If the project is a net financing, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if θ < 0. (29b)
The investment-rate function y(x) unequivocally defines an investment-excess-rate func-
tion φ(ρ) and the financing-rate function x(y) unequivocally defines a financing-excess-rate
function ρ(φ). The particular cases studied by TRM (x = r and y = r) become ρ = 0 and
φ = 0; in the former case, φ = φ(0) and NPV (r) = φ(0) · I(0, φ(0)) so that Rule 1 becomes
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if φ(0) > 0;
in the latter case, ρ = ρ(0) and NPV (r) = −ρ(0) ·B(ρ(0), 0) so that Rule 2 becomes
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ρ(0) < 0.
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Excess rates and markups supply the same information, albeit in different forms: an excess
rate enters an arithmetic (i.e., additive) relation, whereas a markup enters a geometric (i.e.
multiplicative) relation:
1 + ı = (1 + r) + θ (30)
1 + ı = (1 + r)(1 + ϑ). (31)
Markups and excess rates relate each other in the following way:
ρ = %(1 + r)
φ = ϕ(1 + r)
θ = ϑ(1 + r)
Therefore, assuming x = r, the excess return φ can be interpreted as the maximum financing
rate over and above the equilibrium rate that investors can accept to fund the invested
amounts in the lending periods, while ϕ can be viewed as the investment markup which
is necessary to charge the equilibrium rate in order to generate y. Analogously, assuming
y = r, ρ can be interpreted as the minimum lending rate over and above the equilibrium
rate that investors can accept to invest the borrowed amounts, while % can be viewed as the
financing markup which is necessary to charge the equilibrium rate in order to give rise to x.
When both x and y differ from r, θ represents the maximum average financing rate over the
equilibrium rate r which is acceptable by the investors (if I > B) or the minimum average
investment rate that is acceptable by the investors (if B > I). Analogously, ϑ represents the
average investment or financing markup on the equilibrium rate.
Example 1. Table 1 supplies the data for a project such that ~f = (300,−280,−100,−330, 430).
Suppose the financing rate is x = 0.06. This implies that the project investment rate is
y(0.06) = 0.0886.7 Also, TB = {1, 2} and TI = {3, 4}, so ~ı = (0.06, 0.06, 0.0886, 0.0886).
Assuming r = 8%, the net return is 0.0886 · 337.8− 0.06 · 310.4 = 11.3 and the net invested
capital is 337.8− 310.4 = 27.4, so the project rate of return is ı = 11.3/27.4 = 0.4124 > 0.08:
the project is worth undertaking. The NPV can be computed as NPV = 27.4 · (0.04124 −
0.08) = 9.1, which is decomposed as follows. Most of the created value is generated in the
financing periods: NPVB = 310.4 · (0.08− 0.06) = 6.2. In the investment periods, the value
7Note that the IRR of this project does not exist.
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created is NPVI = 337.8 · (0.0886 − 0.08) = 2.9. This means that about 68% of the total
value created comes from financing, while the remaining 32% is due to investment.
Consistently, the financing excess rate is ρ = 0.06− 0.08 = −0.02, which means that the
investor borrows at a financing rate which is smaller than the cost of capital by two percentage
points. This favorable situation is enhanced by an investment rate which is greater than the
cost of capital; in particular, the excess investment rate is φ = 0.0886 − 0.08 = 0.0086.
Accordingly with these figures, the financing markdown is % = −0.02/1.08 = −0.0185 and
the investment markup is ϕ = 0.0086/1.08 = 0.0079. The project’s excess return and the
project’s markup are, respectively,
θ =
0.0086 · 364.8− (−0.02) · 335.2
29.6
= 0.3324
ϑ =
0.0079 · 364.8− (−0.0185) · 335.2
29.6
= 0.3077
and, as expected, 0.3324 = 0.3077·(1.08). The positive signs of θ and ϑ signal value creation.8
Table 1: Description of example 1
time cash flow financing investment rate COC excess rate markup
t ft |ct−1| ct−1 (x, y) r (ρ, φ) (%, ϕ)
0 300 300 6% 8% −2% −1.85%
1 −280 38 6% 8% −2% −1.85%
2 −100 59.7 8.86% 8% 0.86% 0.79%
3 −330 395 8.86% 8% 0.86% 0.79%
4 430
NPV =9.1 B=310.4 I=337.8 ı=41.24% θ = 33.24% ϑ = 30.77%
If one selected x = r = 8%, as in TRM’s Rule 1, one nullified the value which is created
in the financing periods, shifting value off of the financing region onto the investment regions.
In this case, y(0.08) = 0.1078 would be obtained, and, consequently, I = 327, B = 315.5.
Therefore, the assumed net invested capital would be equal to I − B = 11.45, and the net
8We have used I ′ and B′ for computing ϑ and θ: the same result is obtained by using I and B.
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return turned out to be 10, whence the implied project rate of return: ı = 10/11.45 = 0.875 >
0.08. Hence,
NPV = 11.45 · (0.875− 0.08) = 9.1 = 327 · (0.1078− 0.08) = NPVI .
In terms of markup, TRM’s Rule 1 assumes % = 0, which means ϕ(0) = 0.0258, so that
y = 0.08 + 0.0258 · (1.08) = 0.1078.
In contrast, if one selected y = r = 8%, as in TRM’s Rule 2, one would shift the value
off of the investment region onto the financing region, finding x(0.08) = 0.05, I = 342.7,
B = 307.9, ı = 34.1% and
NPV = 34.9 · (0.0341− 0.08) = 9.1 = 307.9 · (0.08− 0.05) = NPVB.
In terms of markup, y = 8% means ϕ = 0, whence %(0) = −0.0274%, so that x = 0.08 −
0.0274 · (1.08) = 0.05, as already seen.
Example 2. An investor is offered a transaction whereby he makes a down payment of $2,
another payment of $5 at the end of two months, and a third payment of $75 at the end of
three months, in exchange for a payment of $20 at the end of one month and a payment of
$70 at the end of four months. The borrowing rate is assumed to be x = 7%, which implies
y(0.07) = 0.164. The COC is r = 20%. Table 2 describes the transaction.9
Table 2: Description of example 2
time cash flow financing investment rate COC excess rate markup
t ft |ct−1| ct−1 (x, y) r (ρ, φ) (%, ϕ)
0 −2 2 16.4% 20% −3.56% −2.97%
1 20 17.7 7% 20% −13% −10.83%
2 −5 13.9 7% 20% −13% −10.83%
3 −75 60.1 16.4% 20% −3.56% −2.97%
4 70
NPV =1.55 B=20.3 I=30.7 ı=35% θ = 15% ϑ = 12.5%
9Note that the IRR is equal to  = 834.61%.
18
The project’s borrowing side creates value: NPVB = 20.3 · (0.2 − 0.07) = 2.64; the
investment side destroys value: NPVI = 30.7 · (0.164 − 0.2) = −1.09. The former more
than compensates the latter, so the net effect is favorable: NPV = 2.64 − 1.09 = 1.55.
The net return is 0.164 · 30.7 − 0.07 · 20.3 = 3.6; dividing by the net invested capital of
10.4, one gets the project rate of return: ı = 0.35 > 0.2 = r. The NPV is found back as
NPV = 10.4 ·(0.35−0.20) = 1.55. Consistently, the excess financing rate is ρ = −0.13, which
means that the investor is able to borrow, at time 2 and 3, at a financing rate which is smaller
than the market rate by 13 percentage points; the excess investment rate is φ = −0.0356,
which means that the investment made in the first and fourth periods are less profitable than
they would be if funds were invested at the cost of capital by 3.56 percentage points. As seen,
the net effect is positive: θ = 0.15 > 0. In terms of marking up/down, one gets a financing
markdown equal to % = −0.1083 and an investment markdown equal to ϕ = −0.0297, so the
project markup is ϑ = 0.125 > 0.
Example 3. A firm, which does contract-based work, receives a purchase order from a cus-
tomer, accompanied by an upfront payment of $20,000 for the delivery of some goods after
three months. The production begins after one month and involves expenditures of $22, 000
after one month, $80, 000 after two months. At the end of three months, the finished prod-
uct is delivered. The customer settles the account with two installments of $90, 000 at the
delivery and $14,000 after one month. This implies ~f = (20,−22,−80, 90, 14) (in thousands).
The upfront payment can be interpreted, from the perspective of the firm, as a non-interest-
bearing liability, which means x = 0. This implies y(0) = 0.2295 and TB = {1}, TI = {2, 3, 4},
so that ~ı = (0, 0.2295, 0.2295, 0.2295). Assuming a cost of capital of r = 20% the firm creates
value in the first period, for the down payment made by the customer bears no interest pay-
ments: if the firm turned to the market to borrow the same amount, the firm would have to
pay 20% interest; the excess financing rate is then ρ = −0.2 and the financing NPV turns
out to be NPVB = 3, 333. The following periods are investment periods: the firm earns
a 22.95% return, that is, it earns an excess rate equal to φ = 0.0295 over and above the
market rate; the investment NPV is NPVI= 1,612, so the project is worth undertaking:
NPV = 3, 333 + 1, 612 = 4, 946. The project rate of return ı = 0.33 > 0.20 and the excess
rate of return is then θ = 0.13 > 0. Given that ρ is negative, the firm gets a financing mark-
down, which is equal to % = −0.1667; the investment markup is equal to ϕ = 0.0246. Note
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that two thirds of the NPV is generated by the upfront payment. If the latter were less than
$10,447, then the firm would not find it economically profitable to produce the product;10 it
should then find a different strategy to increase the NPV (e.g., by increasing the price, by
anticipating the customer’s last payment by one month, by reducing costs, etc.).
4 Generalizing the approach: varying rates and constant markups
In the TRM model x, y, r are constant. In this section, we generalize allowing for varying
rates. Let ~x = (xt, t ∈ TB) and ~y = (yt, t ∈ TI) be vectors of borrowing rates and investment
rates. The capital is recursively defined as
ct(~x, ~y) =
 ct−1(~x, ~y)(1 + xt)− ft if ct−1(~x, ~y) ≤ 0ct−1(~x, ~y)(1 + yt)− ft if ct−1(~x, ~y) > 0. (32)
Let the (non-flat) term structure of interest rates be described by ~r = (r1, ..., rn) where rt is
the forward (equilibrium) rate between t− 1 and t. Let vt,s be the value at s of a monetary
unit available at time t: vt,s :=
∏t
j=s+1(1 + rj)
−1, t ≥ s, with vt,t := 1.
In a recent paper, Chiu and Garza Escalante (2012) (CG hereafter) retrieve the original
TRM model and allow for varying COCs under the following assumptions:
(i) every financing rate xt is set equal to the equilibrium rate rt
(ii) the investment rate yt is linked to the equilibrium rate; in particular, yt is marked up by
the same multiplicative amount ϕ
We summarize CG’s result in the following
Theorem 4.1 (CG Theorem). If xt = rt for every t ∈ TB, then there exists a unique markup
ϕ such that yt = rt + ϕ(1 + rt) for every t ∈ TI and
NPV (~r) > 0 if and only if ϕ > 0. (33)
CG call ϕ the “Generalized Relative Rate of Return”. CG’s citerion can be seen as a gen-
eralization of TRM’s Rule 1, and it is consistent with it in that financing rates are made to
coincide with the costs of capital in each period.
10With a down payment of $10,447.09, the investment rate is y(0) = 0.1758, the NPV becomes zero and
the project rate of return becomes 20%, equal to the COC.
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In this section we keep CG’s assumption (ii), but relax assumption (i) and allow for
financing rates that vary in line with equilibrium rates as well; in particular, we assume
that the financing rates are obtained by marking up the equilibrium rates by a constant
multiplicative amount %.
As a first step, we generalize TRM1 by showing that there exists a unique invertible
markup function.
Theorem 4.2. If xt = rt+%(1+rt) for every t ∈ TB and yt = rt+ϕ(1+rt) for every t ∈ TI ,
the equation cn(~x, ~y) = 0 implicitly defines a unique function ϕ = ϕ(%) which is continuous
and strictly increasing. The same equation also defines a function % = %(ϕ), itself strictly
increasing.
Proof. Consider a modified project p′ with a cash-flow vector ~f ′ = (f ′0, f ′1, . . . , f ′n) such that
f ′t := ft/
∏t
k=1(1 + rk), t = 1, . . . , n, f
′
0 = f0. Consider the recursive relation for p
′:
c′t = c
′
t(%, ϕ) =
c
′
t−1(1 + %)− f ′t if c′t−1 ≤ 0
c′t−1(1 + ϕ)− f ′t if c′t−1 > 0
with c′0 := −f ′0. Remembering that the assumptions imply 1 + xt = (1 + rt)(1 + %) and
1 + yt = (1 + rt)(1 + ϕ), the recursive relation for p is
ct = ct(%, ϕ) =
ct−1(1 + rt)(1 + %)− ft if ct−1 ≤ 0ct−1(1 + rt)(1 + ϕ)− ft if ct−1 > 0
with c0 := −f0. We now show, by induction, that, c′t
∏t
k=1(1+rk) = ct for every t = 1, . . . , n.
Let t = 1. We have c′0 = c0 = −f0, so
c′1 =
c
′
0(1 + %)− f ′1 = −f0(1 + %)− f11+r1 if c′0 = c0 ≤ 0
c′0(1 + ϕ)− f ′0 = −f0(1 + ϕ)− f11+r1 if c′0 = c0 > 0.
Multiplying by (1 + r1), one gets c
′
1(1 + r1) = c1. Let us assume that c
′
j
∏j
k=1(1 + rk) = cj
for some j > 1. Then,
c′j+1 =
c
′
j(1 + %)− f ′j+1 if c′j ≤ 0
c′j(1 + ϕ)− f ′j+1 if c′j > 0
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which implies
c′j+1 =

cj∏j
k=1(1+rk)
(1 + %)− f ′j+1 if cj ≤ 0
cj∏j
k=1(1+rk)
(1 + ϕ)− f ′j+1 if cj > 0
whence
c′j+1
j+1∏
k=1
(1 + rk) =
cj(1 + rj+1)(1 + %)− fj+1 if cj ≤ 0cj(1 + rj+1)(1 + ϕ)− fj+1 if cj > 0
which just means c′j+1
∏j+1
k=1(1 + rk) = cj+1. Therefore, c
′
t
∏t
k=1(1 + rk) = ct for every t. In
particular, c′n
∏n
k=1(1 + rk) = cn and, thus, the pairs (%, ϕ) which satisfy c
′
n(%, ϕ) = 0 are
exactly the pairs which satisfy cn(%, ϕ) = 0. Applying TRM1 to ~f
′, the thesis is obtained.
Definition 4.1. A pair (%, ϕ) is said to be admissible if and only if cn(%, ϕ) = 0.
We now show that a suitable average of the markups (affine combination of rates) captures
the project’s economic profitability, so generalizing both CG Theorem and eq. (26).
Theorem 4.3. Let (%, ϕ) be an admissible pair of markups. Then,
NPV (~r) = ϕI ′ − %B′ (34)
where I ′ := I ′(%, ϕ) =
∑
t∈TI ct−1v
t−1,0, B′ := B(%, ϕ) =
∑
t∈TB |ct−1|vt−1,0 and there is a
unique project markup
ϑ = ϑ(%, ϕ) =
ϕ · I ′ − % ·B′
I ′ −B′ (35)
such that
NPV (~r) > 0 if and only if ϑ > 0 (36)
(if I ′ < B′ the sign is reversed).
Proof. It suffices to note that (9) holds replacing r with rt, (1 + x) with (1 + rt)(1 + %), and
(1 + y) with (1 + rt)(1 + ϕ) , so that, after some algebraic manipulations,
NPV (~r) = ϕ
∑
t∈TI
ct−1(1 + rt)vt,0 + %
∑
t∈TB
ct−1(1 + rt)vt,0 = ϕI ′ − %B′. (37)
Dividing by I ′ −B′,
NPV (~r)
I ′ −B′ =
ϕI ′ − %B′
I ′ −B′ = ϑ.
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The decision rule in (36) follows by noting that the right-hand side has the same sign as the
NPV if and only if I ′ > B′.
The Generalized Rate of Return found by CG (2012) is the value taken on by the function ϕ(%)
when % = 0 (i.e., when xt = rt in each period), so CG Theorem is embedded in Theorem 4.3.
To show it, remember that % = 0 implies ϕ = ϕ(0), and (34) becomes
ϕ(0) · I ′ = NPV (~r) > 0 if and only if ϕ(0) > 0 (38)
which is just eq. (33).
As seen, CG’s choice xt = rt generalizes TRM’s Rule 1. Evidently, one can make the sym-
metric choice yt = rt for every t ∈ TI and generalize TRM’s Rule 2 by fixing the investment
rate equal to the equilibrium rate in each investment period. Formally, this means ϕ = 0, so
that % = %(0) whence
−%(0) ·B′ = NPV (~r) > 0 if and only if %(0) < 0 (39)
However, the choices ϕ = 0 and % = 0 are only two possible cases. More generally, Theorem
4.3 allows the evaluator to cope with ϕ 6= 0 and % 6= 0, which means xt 6= rt for every t ∈ TB
and yt 6= rt for every t ∈ TB. As Theorem 4.2 shows, there are infinitely many pairs (%, ϕ)
which plot on the implicit function defined by the equation cn(%, ϕ) = 0, and an appropriate
mean of the two markups signals wealth creation.
Exploiting, again, the linearity of the mean operator, relations among rates, excess rates
and markups are easy to obtain. The project financing rate and the project investment rate
are the means of the period financing rates and the period investment rates, respectively:
x =
∑
t∈TB xt · |ct−1|vt,0∑
t∈TB |ct−1|vt,0
=
∑
t∈TB xt · |ct−1|vt,0
B
(40a)
y =
∑
t∈TI yt · ct−1vt,0∑
t∈TI ct−1v
t,0
=
∑
t∈TI yt · ct−1vt,0
I
(40b)
where ct−1 := ct−1(~x, ~y), and, in turn, the project rate of return is the weighted mean of x
and y:
ı =
yI − xB
I −B . (41)
Analogously, we can define a financing cost of capital and an investment cost of capital
by separately averaging out the rt’s in the borrowing periods (t ∈ TB) and the rt’s in the
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investment periods (t ∈ TI):
rB =
∑
t∈TB rt|ct−1|vt,0∑
t∈TB |ct−1|vt,0
=
∑
t∈TB rt|ct−1|vt,0
B
(42a)
rI =
∑
t∈TI rtct−1v
t,0∑
t∈TI ct−1v
t,0
=
∑
t∈TI rtct−1v
t,0
I
. (42b)
In turn, the project cost of capital is the mean of rB and rI :
r =
rII − rBB
I −B . (43)
Hence, the financing and investment excess rates are, respectively,
ρ = x− rB (44)
φ = y − rI (45)
and the project excess return is
θ = ı− r (46)
which turns out to be, not surprisingly, a mean of excess financing rate and excess investment
rate:
θ =
ρI − φB
I −B . (47)
Further, after some algebraic passages, the following equalities are found: I ′ = (1 + rI) and
B′ = (1 + rB), so that
I ′ −B′ = I(1 + rI)−B(1 + rB) = (I −B)(1 + r)
whence
(1 + x) = (1 + rB)(1 + %) (48a)
(1 + y) = (1 + rI)(1 + ϕ) (48b)
(1 + ı) = (1 + r)(1 + ϑ) (48c)
ρ = %(1 + rB) (48d)
φ = ϕ(1 + rI) (48e)
θ = ϑ(1 + r) (48f)
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which generalize the relations found in section 3. So, one can interpret ϑ = ϑ(%, ϕ) as the rate
which marks up the project cost of capital r to get the project rate of return ı. Equivalently,
θ can be interpreted as the maximum average borrowing rate (if I > B) or minimum average
investment rate (if I < B) that the project can sustain without decreasing the investors’
wealth. Owing to the above relations and Theorem 4.3, we can then state a generalized
version of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Theorem 4.4. Let (~x, ~y) be any pair of vectors satisfying cn(~x, ~y) = 0 and such that xt =
rt +%(1 + rt), t ∈ TB, and yt = rt +ϕ(1 + rt), t ∈ TI . Then, there exists a unique project rate
of return ı which is an affine combination of project investment rate y and project financing
rate x:
ı =
yI − xB
I −B (49)
and a unique cost of capital, which is an affine combination of the investment COC and the
financing COC:
r =
rII − rBB
I −B . (50)
The NPV is
NPV (r) = (I −B)(ı− r) (51)
whence the acceptability rule
If the project is a net investment, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ı > r (52a)
If the project is a net financing, then NPV (r) > 0 if and only if ı < r. (52b)
Also,
NPV (r) = (y − rI)I + (rB − x)B. (53)
Remark 4.1. Equation (42) reveals the existence of two different costs of capital and (53)
highlights the major role played by them. When equilibrium rates are constant, one can
appreciate the role of invested capital and borrowed capital, but only when equilibrium rates
are variable the two costs of capital arise, one for the investment side and one for the borrowing
side. They represent a foregone rate of return (I could be invested at rI) and a foregone rate
of cost (B could be borrowed at rB), respectively. The first one affects the investment NPV
and the second one affects the financing NPV :
NPVI = (y − rI)I, NPVB = (rB − x)B.
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Remark 4.2. One might reframe the project markup in (35) in terms of I and B, so that
ϑ :=
ϕI − %B
I −B .
However, so doing, ϑ is not a markup of the project’s cost of capital any more, but a markup
of an “adjusted” cost of capital R:
R :=
rI · ϕI − rB · %B
ϕI − %B =
rI ·NPVI − rB ·NPVB
NPV
whence
1 + ı = (1 +R)(1 + ϑ).
R and r coincide if rB = rI . In this case, I
′ = I(1 + r) and B′ = B(1 + r), so
ϑ =
ϕI − %B
I −B =
ϕI ′ − %B′
I ′ −B′ .
Remark 4.3. Note that φ and ρ can be directly obtained from period excess rates. Letting
φt := xt − rt and ρt := yt − rt, then
φ =
∑
t∈TI φtct−1v
t,0
I
, ρ =
∑
t∈TB ρt|ct−1|vt,0
B
.
It is worth noting that the assumption of varying equilibrium rates and constant markups
implies that the φt’s and ρt’s are not constant over time: φt = rt + ϕ(1 + rt) and ρt =
rt + %(1 + rt)
Example 4. Table 3 revisits example 2. The cash-flow vector is unvaried, but we now assume
that the term structure of interest rate is ~r = (0.13, 0.16, 0.19, 0.21). Suppose that the investor
can borrow funds, at each date t ∈ TB, at a financing rate which is equal to the forward rate
marked down by a 1%. That is, % = −0.01 so that
1 + xt = (1 + rt)(1− 0.01).
This implies ϕ(−0.01) = 0.016, which means that, for every t ∈ TI , the investment rate is
equal to the forward rate marked up by a 1.6% return:
1 + yt = (1 + rt)(1 + 0.016).
This also implies that the internal rate-of-return vector is~ı = (0.1481, 0.1484, 0.1781, 0.2294),
the first and fourth rate being investment rates, while the second and third rates being
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financing rates (i.e., TB = {2, 3} and TI = {1, 4}). The project rate of return is greater than
the project COC (0.398 > 0.295), so value is created. The same information is provided by
the project excess rate (θ = 0.1036) and the project markup (ϑ = 0.08), which are both
positive. The financing COC is rB = 0.173 and the project financing rate is x = 0.161,
so the financing NPV is NPVB = 23.3 · (0.173 − 0.161) = 0.27. The investment COC is
rI = 0.206 and the project investment rate is y = 0.225. The investment NPV is NPVI =
31.9(0.225 − 0.206) = 0.62 so that, overall, NPV = 0.89. Note that, while the markups are
constant, the period excess rates vary over time.
Table 3: Example 2 with varying rates and constant markups
time cash flow financing investment rate COC excess rate markup
t ft |ct−1| ct−1 (xt, yt) rt (ρt, φt) (%, ϕ)
0 −2 2 14.81% 13% 1.81% 1.6%
1 20 17.7 14.84% 16% −1.16% −1%
2 −5 15.3 17.81% 19% −1.19% −1%
3 −75 56.9 22.94% 21% 1.9% 1.6%
4 70
NPV =0.89 B=23.3 I=31.9 ı=39.8% r = 29.5% θ = 10.36% ϑ = 8%
CG’s Generalized Relative Rate of Return is the investment markup which corresponds
to the choice % = 0. With this choice, one would get the investment markup ϕ(0) = 0.0233
and the project markup would be ϑ = 0.0828. Hence, the project rate of return would be
ı = 40.6%. Symmetrically, if one chose ϕ = 0, one would get a financing markdown equal
to %(0) = −0.0329 so that ϑ = 0.0741, which would imply a project rate of return equal to
ı = 38.3%.
Example 5. Let us return to Example 3 and assume ~r = (0.15, 0.17, 0.25, 0.3) (see Table 4).
Owing to the down payment, the financing rate in the first period is x1 = 0%, which implies
% = (x1−r1)/(1+r1) = −0.15/1.15 = −0.1304. This implies, in turn, ϕ(−0.1304) = −0.0185.
Hence, TB = {1}, TI = {2, 3, 4} and ~ı = (0, 0.148, 0.227, 0.276). The project investment rate
is y = 22.9% and the project financing rate is x = x1 = 0%. Therefore, the project rate
of return is ı = (0.229 · 55, 436 − 0 · 17, 391)/38, 045 = 33.4%, which exceeds the project
27
cost of capital r = 29.9%, so the project is worth undertaking. However, the investment
side destroys value: the investment COC is rI = 25.2% > 22.9% = y so that NPVI =
55, 436 · (0.229− 0.252) = −1, 282. This unfavorable result is more than compensated by the
financing side: the financing COC is rB = r1 = 15% and the upfront payment of $20,000
creates value: NPVB = 20, 000(0.15 − 0)/1.15 = 2, 609, so that, overall, NPV = 1, 327. It
is worth noting that, if the $20,000 down payment were made at the delivery (time 3), the
NPV would be negative (NPV = −6, 782);11 even if, additionally, $14,000 were shifted from
time 4 to time 3, the NPV would still be negative (NPV = NPVI = −4, 861). In other
words, the negative value of the investment NPV signals a problem in the operating activity:
given the term structure of interest rates, the structure of price and costs for this project is
not adequate; the wealth increase occurs only because of a financing ability of the firm of
collecting a sufficiently high upfront payment (note that it is just the decomposition of the
NPV which reveals this problem).
Table 4: Example 3 with varying rates and constant markups
time cash flow financing investment rate COC excess rate markup
t ft |ct−1| ct−1 (xt, yt) rt (ρt, φt) (%, ϕ)
0 20,000 20,000 0% 15% −15% −13.04%
1 −22,000 2,000 14.8% 17% −2.2% −1.85%
2 −80,000 82,297 22.7% 25% −2.3% −1.85%
3 90,000 10,972 27.6% 30% −2.4% −1.85%
4 14,000
NPV =1,327 B=17,391 I=55,436 ı=33.4% r = 29.9% θ = 3.49% ϑ = 2.68%
5 A further generalization: Varying rates and varying markups
As seen, TRM (1965a,b) rest on either choice x = r or y = r and derive an investment rate
or a financing rate which signals wealth creation. In section 4, we have completed the TRM
model and generalized it. In particular, (i) TRM’s unique investment-rate function y(x) (and
11In this case, the project would be a pure investment project, so NPV = NPVI .
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its inverse x(y)) has been extended into a unique investment-markup function ϕ(%) (and its
inverse %(ϕ)), (ii) a project rate of return has been derived and (iii) the NPV has been divided
into financing NPV and investment NPV , each of which is associated with its own cost of
capital. We also have shown that the same information may be reframed in terms of excess
returns. However, Theorem 4.2-4.4 can be further generalized to allow for variable markups.
Indeed, to assume that in every investment (financing) period either value is created or value
is destroyed is unnecessarily restrictive; it may well occur that some periods are value-creating
periods (i.e., yt > rt or xt < rt), some other periods are value-destroying periods (i.e., yt < rt
or xt > rt), and some other ones are value-neutral periods (yt = rt or xt = rt). In these
cases, the borrowing rate and the investment rate can be written as xt = rt + %t(1 + rt) and
yt = rt + ϕt(1 + rt) where %t and ϕt are period markups. Once again, we can make use of
(9), with rt replacing r, v
t,0 replacing vt, xt replacing x and yt replacing y, and exploit the
linearity of the mean operator, so that the following generalization of Theorems 4.3 and 4.4
is achieved.
Theorem 5.1. Consider any vector (~x, ~y) such that cn(~x, ~y) = 0. Then, the same thesis as
Theorem 4.4 holds with xt = rt + %t(1 + rt) and yt = rt + ϕt(1 + rt). Also,
NPV (~r) = ϕI ′ − %B′
where
ϕ :=
∑
t∈TI ϕtct−1v
t−1,0∑
t∈TI ct−1v
t−1,0 % :=
∑
t∈TB %tct−1v
t−1,0∑
t∈TB ct−1v
t−1,0
so that
NPV (~r) > 0 if and only if ϑ > 0
where
ϑ :=
ϕI ′ − %B′
I ′ −B′
(sign is reversed if I ′ < B′).
Example 6. An investor has the opportunity of depositing and withdrawing cash flows from
an account balance with prefixed borrowing rates and lending rates which change period by
period. The borrowing rates are activated when the account balance is negative, whereas the
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lending rates are activated when the account balance is positive.
period borrowing rate lending rate
1 23% 16%
2 13% 10%
3 8% 6%
4 20% 19%
Suppose the sequence of cash flows exchanged is ~f = (−2, 20,−5 − 75, 70). This implies
TB = {2, 3}, TI = {1, 4}, and ~ı = (0.16, 0.13, 0.08, 0.19). Assuming ~r = (0.21, 0.1, 0.16, 0.12),
the investment excess rates are φ1 = 16% − 21% = −5%, φ4 = 19% − 12% = 7%, so
the investment region consists of a wealth-creating period (the fourth one) and a wealth-
destroying period (the first one). As for the borrowing region, one period destroys value
(ρ2 = 13%− 10% = 3%) and the other one creates value (ρ3 = 8%− 16% = −8%). Overall,
NPVI = 2.3 and NPVB = 0.38, so that NPV = 2.68 (the project is economically profitable).
The project rate of return is ı = 33.3% and the project COC is r = 12.2%. (The activated
markups/markdowns are ϕ1 = −4.13%, %2 = 2.73%, %3 = −6.9%, ϕ4 = 6.25%.)
We now turn to a particular case of Theorem 5.1 which restricts the choice of the rates
so that all investment rates and all borrowing rates are equal to the equilibrium rates, except
one. Essentially, we consider all-but-one periods to be value-neutral periods, while leaving
one period as the lone determinant of wealth creation/destruction.12 Far from being a bizarre
unrealistic pattern, this idea has a deep economic content which is worth investigating. His-
torically, the idea traces back to Bailey (1959). The author wrote:
the criterion for multiperiod investments can center on a short-term rate when all other
short-term rates are assumed to be equal to the equilibrium rates” (Bailey, 1959, p. 479,
italics supplied).
Formally, consider a project p such that f0 < 0. Set xt = rt for all t ∈ TB and yt = rt for all
t ∈ TI − {b} for some b. This implies that there exists a unique investment rate yb such that
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if yb > rb. (54)
12Note that this pattern of rates cannot be coped with by Theorem 4.4.
30
The proof is straightforward: the financing NPV is zero, since xt = rt for every t ∈ TB so
that
NPV (r) = NPVI =
∑
t∈TI−{b}
vt,0ct−1(yt − rt) + vb,0cb−1(yb − rb)
= vb,0 · cb−1(yb − rb).
(55)
whence (54). If f0 > 0, set yt = rt for t ∈ TI and xt = rt i t ∈ TB − {b} for some b and the
same reasoning leads to the symmetric result:
NPV (r) > 0 if and only if xb < rb. (56)
While Bailey (1959) did not indicate which rate should be allowed to differ from the cost of
capital, we now show that such a choice is unequivocally provided by an efficient market.
In an efficient market, current market prices fully reflect available information. This
means that prices adjust quickly whenever new information arrives. In particular, a firm’s
stock price will instantaneously change (rise or fall) when the decision of undertaking a project
is made public by a firm (see Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, 2011, pp. 326-327). As Rubinstein
(1973, p. 172) put it, “when a project is undertaken, the firm can be viewed in temporary
disequilibrium”, and for the project to be worth undertaking, “it is . . . necessary to show
that, given the market strives for equilibrium, the market value of the stock will increase by
more than the investment outlay” (Bierman and Hass, 1973, p. 122). Formally, let us assume
that the market is efficient and in equilibrium, and let a be a firm facing the opportunity
of undertaking project p. The current value of the firm’s equity V a0 is determined by the
number of outstanding shares N and the share price P :
V a0 = NP.
Let (a1, a2, . . . , aq) be the prospective equity cash flows in absence of the project, where q ≥ n.
Remembering the equilibrium relation (5), before acceptance of the project
a1 + V
a
1 = (1 + r1) ·NP ; (57)
after acceptance of the project, the stock price adjusts to fully reflect new information. Letting
P + ∆P be the new equilibrium price, the firm issues ∆N = c0/(P + ∆P ) shares to finance
the project. The new equilibrium relation is then
(a1 + f1) + (V
a
1 + V
p
1 ) = (1 + r1)(N + ∆N)(P + ∆P ). (58)
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Equations (57) and (58) represent the equilibrium equations for firm a before and after
acceptance of the project, respectively. Let i := (f1 + V
p
1 )/c0 − 1; then, f1 + V p1 = ∆N(P +
∆P )(1 + i), and, subtracting (57) from (58),
∆N(P + ∆P )(i− r1) = (1 + r1)∆P ·N. (59)
The project is worth undertaking if and only if “there is an immediate increase in the value
of the company’s stock as soon as the company is committed to the investment” (Robichek
and Myers, 1965, p. 11. See also Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, 2011, p. 327, Figure 10.13).
This means ∆P > 0, which, owing to (59), holds if and only if i > r1. Also, (59) can be
written as c0(i − r1)/(1 + r1) = ∆P · N . The right-hand side is the increase in the firm’s
equity value; the left-hand side is the project’s NPV , since
NPV (~r) =
n∑
t=0
ftv
t,0 = −c0 + f1 + V
p
1
1 + r1
=
c0(i− r1)
1 + r1
.
Therefore, the NPV is an instantaneous (excess) return, it is
a ‘windfall gain’, which accrues to the owners of the firm as a result of their being
able to invest in a project that is more profitable than the standard market rate.
(Robichek and Myers, 1965, p. 11).
Note that, after equilibrium is restored, nothing else occurs, for “there is no tendency for
subsequent increases and decreases” (Ross, Westerfield and Jordan, p. 327). In particular,
after the windfall gain is realized through the increase in value of the owners’ stock,
income will continue to be realized at a rate of exactly [rt] . . . for the remainder
of the project’s life (Robichek and Myers 1965, p. 11).
Formally, this means that the vector of project’s return rates is~ı = (i, r2, . . . , rn). This vector
is then determined by the price behavior of an efficient market.13 However, such a result is
just the same as the one that would be obtained if the evaluator chose to set xt = rt for
t ∈ TB and yt = rt for t ∈ TI−{1}. Such a choice unequivocally determines y1. In particular,
NPVB = 0, and, from (55) with b = 1,
NPV (~r) = NPVI = v
1,0 · c0(y1 − r1) (60)
13We stress that this (return and) price behavior is valid not only for a firm’s stock but also for any kind of
traded asset (security or portfolio of securities) whenever a state of disequilibrium occurs.
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whence i = y1. Therefore, taking into account Theorem 5.1, we have proved the following
Theorem 5.2. Assume all borrowing rates and investment rates are equal to the equilibrium
rates except in the first period: xt = rt, t ∈ TB, yt = rt, t ∈ TI − {1}. Then, a unique rate
of return y1 = y1(r2, . . . , rn) exists which is equal to the shareholder return i that would be
generated as a windfall gain in an efficient market. The project investment rate is
y =
ic0v
1,0 +
∑
t∈TI−{1} rtct−1v
t,0
I
(61)
and the project financing rate is x = rB. Hence,
NPV (~r) =
c0(i− r1)
1 + r1
NPV (~r) = ∆P ·N
and the project rate of return can be written as
ı = r +
c0
I −B (i− r1)v
1,0 (62)
The project is worth undertaking if and only if y1 = i > r1.
14
Remark 5.1. It is worth noting that the assumptions of Theorem 5.2 imply that all markups
are zero except the first one: 1 + i = (1 + r1)(1 + ϕ1) whence ϕ1 = NPV/c0. The latter is
just the well-known profitability index (PI). The project is worth undertaking if and only if
ϕ1 > 0.
Remark 5.2. The first-period rate of return y1 can be rewritten as
y1 =
f1 + V
p
1
c0
− 1 (63)
=
V p0 (1 + r1)
c0
− 1 (64)
= ϕ1 +
r1V
p
0
c0
. (65)
In such a way, y1 is partitioned into two return components: ϕ1 is the instantaneous share-
holder return accrued as a consequence of the market reaction, while r1 · V p0 /c0 is the rate of
return accrued to the investors after equilibrium has been restored.
14While the theorem implicitly assumes f0 < 0, it holds for f0 > 0 as well. In this case, the role of the
borrowing rates and the investment rates is reversed. Also x1 < r1 as a condition for wealth creation replaces
y1 > r1.
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Example 7. Consider an efficient market where ~r = (0.25, 0.1, 0.18, 0.3) and suppose a firm
undertakes a project whose cash flow stream is ~f = (−35, 20, 18, 39,−30). Setting ıt = rt for
t > 1, the vector ~c = (35, 28.6, 13.5,−23.1) is found. This implies y1 = i = (20+28.6)/35−1 =
38.9% > 25%. Therefore, the market reacts positively to the announcement of the project
undertaking. In the first-period, the excess return is φ1 = 13.9% and the corresponding
markup is ϕ1 = 0.139/1.25 = 11.16%, so the windfall gain determined by the market is
35 · 0.1116 = 3.9 = NPV.
In the other periods, value is neither created nor destroyed: φ2 = ϕ2 = φ3 = ϕ3 = ρ4 = %4 =
0. The internal rate-of-return vector is then ~ı = (0.389, 0.1, 0.18, 0.3), where the last-period
rate is the only financing rate, so it also represents the project financing rate: x4 = x. The
latter coincides with the financing COC: x = rB = 30%. The investment rate (weighted
average of the other period rates) is y = 25.3%, while the investment COC is rI = 18.5%.
The investment positions amount to I = 57.1 and the financing positions amount to B = 10.9.
Therefore, the project rate of return is
ı =
0.253 · 57.1− 0.3 · 10.9
46.2
= 24.2%.
The financing NPV is evidently zero: NPVB = 10.9(0.3 − 0.3) = 0 while the investment
NPV is equal to the overall NPV : NPVI = 57.1 · (0.253− 0.185) = 3.9 = NPV .
6 The average-based TRM model and the AIRR paradigm
The previous sections complete and fully generalize the TRM model. It is evident that the
approach holds for pure projects as well as mixed projects: all theorems keep on holding with
I = 0 (pure borrowing) or B = 0 (pure investment), which means ı = y or ı = x, respectively.
Our model bears very strict relations to the AIRR paradigm (Magni, 2010, 2013) and
can be interpreted as a link between the new literature (Hazen, 2003, 2009; Hartman and
Schafrick, 2004; Magni, 2010, 2013) and that strand of the past literature which aimed
at creating a reliable and economically meaningful theory of rate of return, alternative to
the internal rate of return (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1958; Bailey, 1959; Teichroew, Robichek and
Montalbano, 1965; Weingartner, 1966; Ramsey, 1970).
Some of Magni’s (2010) results are summarized hereafter.
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Definition 6.1. Let ~c a vector of capitals and ~ı the corresponding vector of one-period
internal rates of return. Any weighted mean k of such rates is called Average Internal Rate
of Return (AIRR):
k = w1ı1 + . . .+ wnın (66)
where wt = ct−1vt,0/C and C :=
∑n
t=1 ct−1v
t. The difference between an AIRR and the cost
of capital is the “excess AIRR” ξ := k − r.
Theorem 6.1 (AIRR fundamental theorem). The project NPV is given by
NPV (r) = C · (k − r); (67)
so, if the project is a net investment (borrowing), then it is acceptable if and only if k > r
(<). If k =  and the cost of capital is constant (rt = r), then the rule is equivalent to Hazen’s
(2003) acceptability rule.
The AIRR paradigm and our average-based TRM model are two sides of the same coin.
In Magni (2010, 2013), the analysis starts from exogenous fixation of capitals ct; in our
approach, the analysis starts from exogenous fixation of the period rates xt and yt; then, we
pick ıt = xt or ıt = yt depending on the sign of the capital (which is itself a function of the
rate). There is a one-to-one correspondence between capitals and period rates:
ıt =
ct + ft − ct−1
ct−1
⇐⇒ ct = ct−1(1 + ıt)− ft
which implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between vector ~c and vector ~ı. This
has been explicitly recognized in Magni (2010): “It is important to underline that the internal
return vector k and the investment stream c are in a biunivocal relation” (p. 155) Hence,
ı = k, ξ = θ and C = I − B, which implies that the AIRR paradigm and the average-based
TRM model are logically equivalent.
Conceptually speaking, the average-based TRM model reframes the AIRR approach so
as to give particular emphasis to financing and investment: the sequence of period rates ~ı is
divided into a sequence ~x of period rates associated with negative capitals and a sequence
~y associated with positive capitals. In such a way, the contribution of either side to value
creation is found, as well as the subtle relations among the various groups of rates. The
project rate of return in the TRM model is just an AIRR, that is, an average of internal
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rates of return: the project financing rate x and the project investment rate y. (Generalizing
the TRM model, the project financing rate and project investment rate become themselves
weighted averages of one-period IRRs, namely, the x′ts and the y′ts.)
The “Economic AIRR”, introduced in Magni (2013), derives from a specific choice of ~c,
named “economic depreciation”. Economic depreciation represents the change in an asset’s
present value: V pt−1−V pt , so the economic income is ft− (V pt −V pt−1) (see Brealey, Myers and
Allen, 2011, p. 331. See also Lindblom and Sjo¨gren, 2009). The use of economic depreciation
is equivalent to choosing ~c = (c0, V
p
1 , V
p
2 , . . . , V
p
n−1). This entails that the economic rate of
return is (ft + V
p
t − V pt−1)/Vt−1 for t > 1 and (f1 + V p1 − c0)/c0 for t = 1. But (ft + V pt −
V pt−1)/V
p
t−1 = rt and (f1 + V
p
1 − c0)/c0 = i. This means that the associated internal-rate-of-
return vector is ~ı = (i, r2, . . . , rn) and the AIRR is
k =
ic0v
1,0 + r2c1v
2,0 + . . .+ rncn−1vn,0
C
(68)
whence
k = =
ic0v
1,0 + r2c1v
2,0 + . . .+ rncn−1vn,0 + r1c0v1,0 − r1c0v1,0
C
= r +
(i− r1)c0v1,0
C
.
(69)
Remembering that C = I − B, eq. (62) and eq. (68) coincide. We have then proved the
following result.
Proposition 6.1. The economic AIRR, found by exogenously assuming a capital stream
equal to economic values, is the rate of return which is obtained by exogenously assuming that
the rates of return are those determined by an efficient market where investors quickly react
and fully absorb the new information on the firm’s project.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper completes Teichroew, Robichek and Montalbano’s (TRM) (1965a,b) model, gen-
eralizes it and turns it into a complete model of value (i.e., wealth) creation, where relations
among the various value drivers are explicitly supplied.
We start from the original TRM model, which aimed at providing a more reliable model
of economic profitability than that provided by the unsatisfactory internal rate of return
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(IRR). An ingenious device, TRM model as such is, nonetheless, restrictive and incomplete.
Restrictive, because
• either project investment rate or project financing rate are assumed to be equal to the
cost of capital
• financing rate and investment rate are assumed to be constant over time
• cost of capital is assumed to be constant over time;
incomplete, because
• no project rate of return is supplied (investment rate and financing rate capture only
part of the project’s economic performance)
• no explicit relation is given among the project’sNPV , the financing rate, the investment
rate, and the cost of capital.
We relax TRM’s assumptions, expand the model, and generalize it so as to enable the eval-
uator to accomplish a detailed analysis of the project’s economic performance. To this end,
we make use of an average-based approach. More precisely, we show that the project’s rate
of return is obtained as an affine combination of the financing rate and the investment rate,
where the weights are the amount invested in the investment region and the amount bor-
rowed in the borrowing region. The comparison between the project rate of return and the
cost of capital signals value creation or value destruction. TRM’s two acceptability rules are
particular cases.
We also isolate the value drivers by decomposing the NPV into financing side and in-
vestment side, which enables the evaluator to understand how value is generated and how
the operating activity and the financing policy interact to increase or decrease the investors’
wealth.
We reframe the results in terms of financing and investment excess rates and in terms
of financing and investment markups/markdowns, the latter being equal to the former dis-
counted at the cost of capital. We then derive the project excess rate (project markup) as a
capital-weighted mean of the financing excess rate (financing markup) and investment excess
rate (investment markup): its sign correctly signals value creation.
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Then, we allow for varying financing and investment rates and varying costs of capital.
To this end, we employ a two-step generalizing process. As a first step, we assume that
both financing and investment markups are constant over time and show that there exists a
unique invertible investment-rate function that satisfies the project’s terminal condition. In
such a way, once the financing markup (investment markup) is selected, a unique investment
markup (financing markup) is found. This is a generalization of TRM’s unique investment-
rate function. The sign of the weighted average of the two markups correctly captures value
creation. Chiu and Garza Escalante (2012)’s “Generalized Relative Rate of Return” is shown
to be a particular case of this approach, obtained when the financing markup is set equal to
zero.
As a second step, we relax the assumption of constant markups and allow for any pattern
of period markups, which implies that any pattern of period (financing or investment) rates
is allowed. In such a way, Magni’s (2013) “Economic AIRR” is found to be a particular case,
when all period financing rates and investment rates are set equal to the costs of capital,
except in the first period. We show that such a rate is related to Bailey’s (1959) proposal
of value creation in one period and is equal to the rate of return that would accrue to
shareholders of a firm whose shares are traded in an efficient market, that is, a market where
investors react quickly to the announcement of the project undertaking.
We show that this paper’s approach is logically equivalent to the AIRR paradigm, the
difference lying in the framing of the model: while Magni (2010, 2013) starts from interim
capitals to compute the project’s one-period rates, we start from (financing and investment)
rates to estimate the (invested and borrowed) capitals. Given that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the vector of rates and the vector of capitals, the two approaches
coincide formally and conceptually. In this regard, this paper links TRM model and AIRR
paradigm and, therefore, constitutes a bridge between past and recent literature on rates of
return.
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Table 5: List of rates
constant rate variable rates
x project financing rate x
y project investment rate y
ı project rate of return ı
financing cost of capital rB
investment cost of capital rI
r project cost of capital r
% financing markup %
ϕ investment markup ϕ
ϑ project markup ϑ
ρ excess financing rate ρ
φ excess investment rate φ
θ project excess return rate θ
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